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Abstract 
In this piece I ask the question: How has education contributed to the formation or prevention of 
nationalism in Germany and Japan? In examining this, after defining the standard conceptions of 
nationalism, I apply these definitions to pre-war and post-war Germany and Japan. Ultimately, I 
conclude that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are taught, history 
curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute to the rise of 
nationalism within a country. Based on these fields, I find that although there are similar 
nationalist trends in both countries during the pre-war period, in the post-war period, Germany 
has altered these structures to diverge more significantly from its past than Japan. 
Key Words 
Nationalism, Germany, Japan, Education, Comparative 
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Introduction 
In the fall of 2017, while watching the Trump presidency begin to unfold, I found myself in a 
History of the Holocaust course as social media was already roaring with comparisons between 
the new administration and the Third Reich. In fact, the whole globe seemed to be ablaze in 
panic as right-wing movements took hold in numerous countries. In particular, the word being 
tossed around at the time was ​nationalism​, and at such an intersection, I could not help but pay 
attention. The connection between this subject that I was studying in my class and its appearance 
in modern discussion was compelling, and I wanted to know more. However, as a broad subject, 
I chose to narrow my focus specifically to the connection between nationalism and formal 
education extending through higher secondary. As a case study, I examined the two countries I 
have been studying most as a student: Germany and Japan.  
In doing so, the central question that I asked was: How has education contributed to the 
formation or prevention of nationalism in Germany and Japan?  
However, this question is easier broken down as: 
1) What is nationalism? 
2) How did education contribute to the rise of nationalism in pre-war Germany and Japan? 
3) How have these categories been witnessed in the modern education system to either 
promote or work against the formation of nationalism? 
I ultimately find that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are taught, history 
curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute to the rise of 
nationalism within a country. Based on this, I find that although there are similar nationalist 
trends in both countries during the pre-war period, in the post-war period, Germany has made 
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definite strides to steer away from nationalism in these areas, while Japan has at the government 
level, struggled to move from pre-war trends, despite meeting some success at the local level.  
 
Literature Review 
What is nationalism? 
Mostly basically, Merriam-Webster defines nationalism as “a sense of national consciousness 
exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture 
and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups”, and Britannica 
describes an “individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state [that surpasses] other 
individual or group interests”. Sivamohan Valluvan emphasizes the role of a defined normative 
community that appropriates ideals and platforms to further define its exclusivity and separation 
(238). Kersten Rikki, Jack Snyder and Peter Stearns highlight variations in nationalism. Kersten 
Rikki discusses current debates in Japan surrounding nationalism and addresses the difference 
between the more traditional model of nationalism, which embraces top-down dynamics, and the 
neo-nationalist trends, which simultaneously have insisted on the autonomy of the nation from 
the state while denouncing post-war democracy for curbing rehabilitated nationalism (193). Jack 
Snyder notes the current emphasis on the national over the global along with the idea of citizens 
versus non-citizens (54) as he describes the current wave of populist nationalism. Finally, Peter 
Stearns discusses not just the development of nationalism along with the nation-state but most 
significantly addresses the various contexts of nationalism. For example, he contrasts cultural 
and political nationalisms, dominant versus liberal nationalisms, various approaches to 
minorities, civic versus ethnic based nationalism and more. All of these contributors highlight 
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the complexity of nationalism. However, in order to examine nationalism in this research, both 
Jack Snyder and Peter Stearns acknowledge this complexity, and similar to the dictionary 
definitions, bring nationalism back to its basics. Jack Snyder notes that nationalism is a doctrine 
in which there is a general consensus “that the cultural unity of the nation, whether defined along 
civic or ethnic lines, should be congruent with the political unit of the state” (54), and Peter 
Stearns draws attention to the common ground that is met by various breeds and intensities of 
nationalism, which involves “a special consciousness of and loyalty to a nation, in turn defined 
as a distinctive entity in which people in a particular geographical region are held to be united by 
a common culture” (62). To dismantle the definitions then, nationalism typically consists of an 
elevation of state over the individual, to which the individual is loyal/expected to be loyal, and 
the definition of said state through various means, typically including common location and 
elevation/promotion of a shared culture.  
How did education contribute to the rise of nationalism in pre-war Germany and Japan? 
Based on the above definitions of nationalism then, in my research on education in Germany and 
Japan, there seemed to be four primary categories related to its development in the pre-war years: 
the overall goal of education, the formation or definition of a unified national identity, the 
manipulation or mythologizing of history, and the control of education by the state.  
Masako Shibata, in her research on the reform of nationalized education systems in the 
post-war period, defines the primary goals of education leading up to World War II. For 
example,  Mori Arinori, founder of the modern Japanese educational system, viewed “the 
ultimate aim of education [as] the key of attaining and maintaining national independence” (78). 
Indeed, as Donald Roden explains, even before Mori became the first Minister of Education, the 
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1872 Educational Code assumed that in stimulating the individual to improve his economic 
welfare and societal position, that the nation would itself be strengthened (21). Therefore, the 
universalization of the education system was not simply to provide opportunity to the citizens of 
the country, but to promote the advancement of the state itself. This was furthered through 
various means, with this intention ultimately being solidified and strengthened by the 1890 
Imperial Rescript on Education, which according to Ian Buruma, defined state education 
principles, emphasizing loyalty to the nation (56). Shibata touches on this as well, noting the 
maintenance of virtues of the state as subjects of the emperor (Shibata 79). Despite this, Mark 
Lincicome discusses some historic variations to this view on the role of education, such as 
Tokutomi Sohō, who argued that education should be rooted in the nature of humanity to 
cultivate the individual (343); however, even Lincicome concedes that ultimately these variations 
folded due to the widespread acceptance of Japanese superiority as well as mounting government 
pressures, so that education ultimately prevailed as a tool for the state (357).  
These purposes only intensified to become more ultra-nationalistic after 1932, as 
Yoshimitsu Khan describes the goals of education during the early Showa era to be the training 
of youth in ‘Japanism’ and the “spirit of national polity in order to serve the ‘race’ and ‘state’ 
(213). At its peak, he explains, ‘Japanism’ involved mysticism, anti-rationalism, anti-foreignism, 
anti-communism, and anti-socialism in order to foster support for Imperialist Japan (219). This 
was further enhanced in 1936, as the purpose of education became more explicitly to emphasize 
the role of Japanese citizens as part of a nation (through the Way of the Subjects) and the 
spiritual enhancement of students to encourage “[loyalty and patriotism] in the military 
nation”(215). In 1937 and 1938 as well, the structure changed in order to support the nation, 
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specifically their war efforts, and routine physical examinations were conducted to ensure 
military preparedness (220). Ultimately, Khan notes, “[t]he goal was to grow & harvest people 
who would dedicate mind and soul to the cause of the war”(218). 
Similar goals existed developed within Germany. Prior to the political consolidation of 
the German state in 1871, Masako Shibata stresses significant strides toward cultural cohesion, 
which were attempted as official statehood through governmental means seemed far-off (80). 
Due to this legacy, Shibata argues that the key political agenda after the formation of the German 
nation-state was the maintenance of unification through “retention of the socio-cultural traditions 
of the German domains”(80). This was enacted largely as the ​Kasierreich​’s educational policy 
developed a political tool out of the long respected tradition of education within the German 
states (84). Lisa Pine details the expansion of this concept and discusses how national education 
developed into an institutionalized a force designed to instill an attitude of submission to 
authority and the state (7). She notes that this trend continued over decades into the Weimar 
Republic, as Otto Boelitz, Prussian Minister of Education between 1921 and 1925 viewed the 
primary goal of education to be “the renewal of national power and unity” (10). This naturally 
carried into the Third Reich, as education became even more explicitly to educate a young 
German population who would be dedicated to service and sacrifice for the state (23).  
Therefore, it is clear that both in Japan and Germany, education was viewed and 
constructed first and foremost for the good of and the strengthening of the state, and this concept 
developed overtime to be increasingly nationalistic.  
In regard to the formation of national identity or a national ideal, Masako Shibata simply 
states, “In Meiji Japan (1868-1912) and the German ​Kaiserreich​ (1871-1918), the educational 
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system assisted the state in the definition of the notions of national identity” (75). In regards to 
Japan, Shibata notes an abrupt formation of national identity following the arrival of Commodore 
Perry, that was later solidified and stressed through educational means. She writes that the “key 
role of primary education was to ensure that all Japanese would share the same sense of national 
identity, and unify the Japanese within the new ideological framework of the Emperor State” 
(79). Shibata, along with Michael Hoffman and Obe Misuru, also references the inclusion of 
Moral Education in Japanese curriculum, which essentially embedded state ideology (Shibata 79) 
and sociocultural values into all educational practice (20). This included the promotion of 
Confucian values at the center of the national identity and situated each individual within the 
larger system of piety (76). Tetsuya Kobayashi confirms this trend, commenting, “Confucianism 
[functioned in the field of education] as a completely secular instruction in literature, ethics, and 
history or political science in the present state of these words” (13). Hoffman contributes to the 
understanding of Moral Education also by providing an example of the 1890 Imperial Rescript 
on Education, which exhorted children to give themselves to the state (1). In addition, Ian Gibson 
notes the role of State-Shinto in this, in which he claims “a powerful spiritual belief (national 
Shintoism) [is linked] with a powerful spiritual presence (the emperor)” (108). This stemmed 
largely from the mythologized idea of Japan’s past, which viewed Japan as a family under the 
emperor, obeying the Imperial Will (110). This trend in particular was increasingly emphasized 
as the nationalism became more ultra-nationalistic in the 1930s. For example, Yoshimitsu Khan 
references The Principles of the National Polity issued in 1937, which includes emphasis on the 
Japanese people as descendents of the Emperor, who is himself considered son of the Sun 
Goddess Amaterasu. Under the emperor then, similar to as Gibson notes, Japan is regarded as a 
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family-state and is expected to pay loyalty to their divine emperor (Khan 215, 220). Therefore, 
the formation of national identity seems to be for the achievement of unity as a nation with the 
same central goals, in particular for the promotion of subordination to the Japanese state. This 
relates to the definitions of nationalism which focus on the emphasis of the collective nation and 
undermining of the individual. 
A similar structure of national identity formation existed in the German education system 
during the pre-war period. As already established, Shibata asserts that education was used largely 
to consolidate state formation through cultural unity; therefore, the concept of national identity 
has been central to German education since its emergence as a state. She explains that before the 
consolidation of a political nation, “the nation of Germany existed within the consciousness of 
the people in the German cultural domains”, and that these early efforts toward cohesion were 
carefully preserved post-1871 in education to maintain said unity (80). Specifically, Shibata 
describes the education of the ​Kaiserreich​ as centered around national identity elements such as 
cultural orientations and values (84), which “[were] consolidated around indigenous elements of 
Kultur​, ​Volk​ and Christianity” (82). In particular, religion, German, and “traditional moral 
disciplines” were emphasized in curricula (84). Louis L. Schnyder describes national identity 
around these traditional cultural lines also, speaking of mythologized heroes from national and 
imperial legends, some of which were taught regularly to schoolchildren, functioning, according 
to Schnyder, to develop a new hope for the nation (185). InesAnna Guhe expands on this, and 
illustrates how Crusade narratives in textbooks included historical figures to cultivate an image 
considered/desired to be characteristic of the nation-a collective ideal (369-370). Notably, 
Germany's national identity was actively exclusionary at this time. As Schnyder implies, this was 
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a largely reactionary movement against enlightenment principles imposed by the outsider 
Napoleon, as the Germans sought to find “that ‘freedom’ which had little in common with 
French and English egalitarianism” (59). In doing so, they looked to “their own idea of an 
organic folk community wrapped in the cloak of tradition” (59). Lisa Pine notes that these 
restrictive definitions of national characteristics and community developed within education to 
increasingly exclude Jewish cultural influences, which were considered foreign (53). However, it 
was with the rise of the Third Reich that these exclusionary measures became most extreme, as 
so-called racial studies were taught to define by “biology”, as well as by other means, the 
differences between the accepted German “Aryan” identity and Jewish identity (56-60). 
Therefore, such definitions of national identity were not only used to unite the nation, but 
specifically to define its constituents or “in-group”.  In addition to this, Pine notes that the girls 
and boys’ education differed to define gendered ideals at the sub-level of national identity (60). 
This was expanded within the increasingly emphasized ​Bund Deutscher Mädel​ and ​Hitler 
Jugend​, which constructed the roles of men and women around the needs of the state (95-132). 
This too falls in line with the overall trends regarding national identity then, which among other 
things, Louis L. Schnyder explains as, the German mind [] molded around the rejection of 
individualism and the acceptance of exaltation of the state (225).  
In both Japan and Germany then, education was used to foster a concept of national 
identity and national ideal, the likes of which was used to promote the idea of the nation, define 
the exclusivity of the nation, and to unite the members of the nation around ideals for the 
advancement of the nation. 
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In examining the next two categories of history and control of education in relation to 
nationalism,  Jahyun Chun writes, “[Those with the power to define history are] able to adjust 
perceptions of history while presenting the direction that the nation should take,” and it is 
through the definition of histories “that people have come to shape certain emotions regarding 
one’s homeland or a foreign country (569).” In doing so, Chun implies the significance of both 
categories in regard to nationalism.  
In relation to history, in reference to Japan, Masako Shibata and Ian Buruma both explain 
how the government stressed the past as a national myth with “a people with common ancestry 
headed by the Emperor, a direct descendant of the unbroken imperial lineage”(Shibata 76), the 
likes of which were connected to the divine (Buruma 191). This continued to be prominently 
taught into the Showa era (Khan 220). Chun, in discussing modern Japanese textbooks, 
highlights a historical trend for Japanese history to be portrayed through a “strictly empiricist 
historiography” that focuses less on deep analysis of events, but rather on a retelling of an 
official narrative of history (570-571). These findings suggest an emphasis on the legacy of 
Japan, which in relation to Chun’s original statement, could easily connect to the promotion of 
advancement, national preservation, and imperialism. In addition, the emphasis on the divine 
lineage could be construed to assert Japanese superiority, justifying these imperialistic goals and 
rationalizing the subjugation of the people. This falls in line heavily with how Khan describes 
history education to have developed during the intensified war period, with history contributing 
to the larger branch of ‘National Studies’, which consolidated the subjects of foreign language, 
history, and geography around the national spirit and promotion of the imperial state (222). This 
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included a clear mythologization of history (216) and the restriction of factual content only to 
what was considered useful to the state (222).  
In Germany, Chun implies a similar historical tendency for history to be portrayed along 
a “grand national narrative” (570). Guhe explains this to be chronologically done (370). In her 
study on the portrayal of the Crusades in history, she writes “[National history] consisted of 
drastically modified narratives of the ‘fictitious early period of the nation’ through to its 
fulfillment in The Reich of 1871” (369). History, by her account, was constructed along narrative 
lines to legitimize and glorify the current German nation and promote its furtherment. She also 
notes an increased shift from 1871 onward to focus more on the history of the nation than on 
world history (369). This could be interpreted to not only promote the formation of a national 
identity but also to advocate the continued development of the nation. Guhe addresses this 
concept as she writes of the ability for national history/mythology to “refer to the future whilst 
recounting past events, thus forming a certain continuum” which would, similar to Chun’s 
argument, in its construction of reality be used to propagate certain ideas, values, and 
constructions of national meaning and purpose (369). Guhe continually refers to narratives of the 
Crusades as an example of this (369). Lisa Pine contributes to this also, citing how history texts 
were “intended to awaken and excite children’s sense of national pride and concern about the 
continued existence of the German state and nation” (50). She notes in particular an emphasis on 
great leaders and historical figures, in particular their “‘world historical’ achievements” (50). 
Specific to Germany, however, was also the use of history books to create narratives of German 
suffering due to the Jewish people, which was then used to increase loyalty to the state and 
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promote the German “struggle” against the “Jewish enemy” (51). In this sense then, history was 
used to strengthens definitions and development of national ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups.  
Relating to the education of history is the centralization of education policy within the 
government. In reference to Japan, Shibata details how the Meiji government established the 
Ministry of Education in 1871 with Mori Arinori himself serving as the first Minister of 
Education. It was through such an institution that the Fundamental Code of Education was 
enacted in 1872, through which “the government shaped the institutional keystone of the modern 
education system (78). Shibata also discusses the invaluable role of the universalization of 
education, built upon an already solid education foundation, in achieving the earlier mentioned 
goals of unity (78-79). As education expanded she explains, so did the control of it through state 
bureaucracy, through which the government instituted their views and policies on curriculum, 
inclusion of moral education, concentration on the imperial dynasty and more (79). In this way, 
Shibata connects control to dissemination of ideology. Roden expands on education under the 
centralized control of the Ministry of Education. In his discussion on pre-war education, Roden 
notes “a series of important ordinances issued in spring of 1886” which “clarified the purposes of 
each level of the school system in terms” (39). Even the prestigious higher schools were under 
the influence of the Ministry of Education (73). By noting these things, Roden indicates a control 
of education that was not distant, but rather one that reached into various facets of the system. 
Kobayashi elaborates on all of this discussion, describing the structure of the education system 
all under the Ministry of Education as well as the Fundamental Code of Education. He describes 
also that “The Ministry prepared the course of study for the elementary schools, a recommended 
list of textbooks, and subsidized local government” (25), suggesting a more pervasive control of 
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education similar to Roden. Kobayashi also includes in his research the establishment of normal 
schools, six of which were set up in various provinces to train teachers, as well as eighty-two 
teacher training schools, which were set up by local governments for the specific training of 
teachers (26). He notes a short period of liberal progression, but maintains that this movement, 
only reaching a handful of private schools, did not last nor did it extend a significant influence to 
deter these nationally structured policies and aims (30).  
In the early Showa period, as Khan explains, state control became especially pronounced. 
After the May 15th Incident of 1932, militarism began to influence politics more strongly, which 
necessarily included the Ministry of Education (217). In 1937, the Education Reform Council 
expressed the unity of religion, politics, and teaching (215), and throughout this time, control of 
teachers (218), schools, and textbooks continued to centralize (215). Also in 1937, the Thought 
Control Department within the Ministry of Education changed its name to the Educational 
Affairs Bureau as it concentrated its efforts largely to the supervision and control of the 
ideological development of students (214-215). In doing so, liberalism was enthusiastically 
undermined and concepts such as national essence continued to be emphasized. In 1941 this 
trend continued into the National School Ordinance Enforcement Regulation, which in its 
policies further promoted imperialist education, national empowerment, and glorification of 
national culture both in school and at home (221). Therefore, as nationalism progressively 
became more extreme in pre-war Japan, the control of education intensified.  
In regard to Germany, Masako Shibata mentions the strong political groundwork of the 
school system (84); however, it is Pine who most thoroughly discusses the education system and 
its purposes. She first speaks of the Stiehl Ordinance in 1854, which standardized the curriculum 
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of the early ​Volksbildung​ as well as the training of teachers, even before national unification (7). 
According to Pine, “because [this standardization stymied the attempts of educational reformers] 
the state played a much larger role in the content of mass education than in previous decades” 
(7). With this, Pine asserts that by the time Germany was politically unified, 
“​Volksbildung​[...]had become institutionalised as a force for inculcating in the common people 
an attitude of submission to authority and state” (7). She notes also that there was an overall 
trend in society toward “the militarization of everyday life” which “created an emphasis on 
hierarchy and obedience to authority” (8). ​ ​Pine also discusses the expansion of compulsory 
schooling (9), along with the expansion of state control. She explains how the Ministry of 
Education, holding among other things, centralized control over the appointment of teachers, was 
increasingly infringed upon by other areas of the government and the NSDAP (21) and how as 
the 1930s continued, the state progressively centralized control. In January 1934, “A 
law[...]removed the autonomy of the ​Laender ​(states) in order to achieve centralized state control 
over education” (27). The Nazi party at this time also eliminated various democratic elements of 
the school systems, such as parents councils and other community roles (27). In addition to this, 
to further consolidate the state control and shaping of education, Pine notes the 
Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund​, which, similar to in Japan, “sought to produce a different 
breed of teachers in the Third Reich and to train them in accordance with his own educational 
imperatives for German society” (13). The organization, although on the decline from 1935 until 
its closure in 1943, was established in 1929 as a means to 1) “provide reports on the political 
reliability of teachers for appointments and promotions” and 2) “ensure the ideological 
indoctrination of teachers” (15). Although it was just for a short while, in this way, the teachers 
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too faced state regulation in order to ensure even further centralization and control of education, 
the likes of which worked to increase ease of ideological dissemination.  
Through both Japan and Germany therefore, it becomes clear that the centralization of 
education existed in both countries and functioned in the hands of the state to further 
nationalistic goals such as the promotion of state ideology and subordination of the individual to 
the state.  
 How can these categories be witnessed in the modern education systems of both countries 
to either promote or work against the formation of nationalism? 
Germany 
When examining how the goals of education have shifted in Germany after the war, Inari Sakki 
and Anna Maija Pirttilä-Backman note that the national goals of teaching history at least, have 
shifted toward “issues related to both multi-perspectivity and identity”(71), and comment that the 
subjects related to identity are carefully handled. The objectives themselves “show no sign of a 
return to a national German history, but the topics related to Germany are placed within general 
European and world contexts” (71). In addition to this, Brian M. Puaca describes the school 
reform in West Berlin, reforms which he cites as being exemplary for the nation (247). In his 
report, he highlights a notable set of guidelines by Carl Heinz Evers. According to Puaca, Evers 
saw the goal of political education-the classification for the reforms-to be “to instill a sense of 
responsibility in every pupil and at the same time provide lessons in citizenship applicable to all 
aspects of life in a democratic society” (259). Therefore, the goals have seemingly shifted from 
focusing on the advancement of the nation and subordination of the individual to the cultivation 
of a democratically competent individual.  
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In regards to identity, this same idea of Evers about a sense of responsibility and 
citizenship linked to democratic society remains somewhat applicable (259), as he indicates a 
transition from the formation of a homogeneous national identity to the cultivation of the 
individual within the nation. Another aspect that seems to be related to national identity is 
expressed in Jahyun Chun’s study on memories of colonization and war in history textbooks. He 
describes how the focus on war and colonization in German textbooks is part of “a gradual 
process to increase awareness of the entire country’s responsibility” (569). Notably, he classifies 
“[such] national incidents [as having] a tremendous impact on forming a country’s identity” 
(569). Rosa-Maria Ndolo suggests a similar construction through education in her article on 
national identity and collective memory. She notes that although students are never taught that 
they are directly guilty or responsible for the crimes of their ancestors, from an early age students 
learn to associate Germany with its Nazi past (62). This is somewhat reminiscent of Masako 
Shibata’s description of Eduard Spranger’s view on national identity in the midst of the post-war 
education reforms, in which he spoke not of teaching people Germanness, but of “educating 
people in the consciousness of being a German”(122). Buruma notes this transition of national 
identity as well, commenting that “[s]choolchildren are no longer asked to identify with flags, 
songs, and heroes, or a carefully constructed sense of historical continuity”(185). He describes 
this as the lack of the “symbolism of national identity”(185). However, elsewhere in his book, 
Buruma notes two features prevalent in German education that speaks somewhat to national 
identity: resistance, as seen through inclusion of resistance heroes (186, 188) and pacifism (25). 
Therefore, although Germany as mentioned before, seems to lack an explicit promotion of a 
unified national identity, especially the lack of a developing heroic legacy or model of its ideal 
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citizen, through education trends seem to have emerged that signal a new German identity 
framed around its guilt. In this way, it seems to not necessarily be nationalistic in the sense of an 
exaltation of the country, but it does suggest a cohesiveness of sorts. 
 Closely linked to national identity is, of course, history. Jahyun Chun describes the 
general shift in the handling of history well, as he notes that “German portrayals shifted from a 
grand national narrative to a more analytical, social-scientific historiography” (571). In line with 
this, Puaca mentions in his study on education reform increased inclusion of opportunities for 
discussion and debate (246), suggesting a shift from the very rigid dissemination of a past 
narrative to a discussion of history that seeks analysis and understanding, as described by Chun. 
Perhaps most significant is the inclusion and emphasis by Germany on its dark past. Buruma, 
Chun, Felix Philipp Lutz (who did a study on historical consciousness in Germany), and Puaca 
all consider Germany’s focus on its darker past in its history noteable, as the country includes 
clear explanation of the Nazi atrocities, the Holocaust, and more in the curricula of all its young 
students (Buruma 149, Chun 579, Lutz 55, Puaca 252). In addition, as mentioned above, Buruma 
notes the inclusion of resistance heroes in Germany’s history curricula (186).  
Besides these general themes discussed in regard to German history, Wolfgang Geiger 
summarizes a presentation by Unsuk Han that was given as part of a conference in reflection on 
global history perspectives in history. In the presentation, Han finds that although textbooks in 
Korea tend to include a large percentage of European history, German textbooks were containing 
an average of 3% Asian history (1). The report ultimately recommends including higher levels of 
global perspectives in history (‘Big History’) in its Germany’s description of the past, the likes of 
which Germany seems to be somewhat weak on (1). However, Inari Sakki and Anna-Maija 
        ​Vrtiska 20 
Pirttilä-Backman suggest improvement in such fields compared to in the nation’s past, claiming 
that “topics related to Germany are placed within general European and world contexts” (71). 
Chun seems to indicate the same, as he highlights trends in textbooks to not assert national myths 
or ideas of nationhood, but rather to “allow European and world history the same curriculum 
time as Germany’s national history” (580). He also notes a smaller focus on national history, the 
likes of which when included, center on contemporary history, particularly 20th century history, 
rather than glorified pasts (580). Despite this, Han’s findings at least suggest a focus on Europe, 
which could potentially relate to an emphasis on an increasingly united Europe. In summary 
then, history seems to have shifted from glorious, romanticized views of the past to analytical, 
multi-perspective looks at both the good and the bad that seek not only to know, but to deeply 
understand Germany’s past. The goal then appears to be directed away from elevation or 
allegiance to state, as had been the trend in the pre-war period. In addition, although there is a 
shift from an overly national approach to history, there seemingly remains a concentration on 
Europe.  
Lastly, in relation to control of education, Inari Sakki and Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman 
describe how “each of [Germany’s] sixteen state governments (​Laender)​ makes decisions about 
its own curriculum” (71), while the Conference of Ministers of Education is able to formulate 
recommendations for “a national approach to educational issues” (71). Jahyun Chun discusses 
this decentralization further in his study on textbooks, and notes minimal state intervention in the 
writing of textbooks, instead relying on teachers-who “dominate[] the creation of curricula and 
textbooks based on their strong claim to professionalism”-and institutions such as the 
Georg-Eckert Institute for Textbook Research, which assists in forming curricula and that even 
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“initiated the set-up of a textbook commission with other countries” (581). Brian M. Puaca adds 
to this, discussing how democratization reform was done at the local level and that grassroot 
efforts by teachers were eventually standardized (246), which highlights early control at the local 
level. In addition to just an overhaul of the structure, Puaca notes how schools were structured to 
encourage the further democratization of society, even the relationship between the students and 
teachers shifting from one of control to respect (260. 264). In this way, it appears that schools 
were not only decentralized to begin with, but were structured to encourage further prevention of 
consolidated state power. In his research, Puaca also describes several of the guidelines that held 
a heavy influence in Berlin (considered to be exemplary to other states), such as those by 
Joachim Tibertius and Carl-Heinz Evers. The outlines, as discussed briefly earlier, suggest 
curricula at each school level such as themes to cover in each school year (250-252). Puaca 
seems to suggest widespread incorporation, but qualifies this by explaining how teachers then 
were able to try out the guidelines at their own will, make alterations and suggest improvements 
to them, and ultimately reform the guidelines to best suit the classrooms (256-257). Therefore, 
through both the development of textbooks themselves, as well as the specific curricula and 
manner of teaching, there appears to be a large decentralization in education that puts education 
in the hands of educators-not politicians, thereby preventing state manipulation of education.  
Japan 
In post-war Japan, the development of goals of education has been significant. As Ian Gibson 
explains in his tracing of the post-war education reform, during the initial post-war occupation 
period, the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education was established which detailed the basic right 
of every citizen to education in Japan. As such, education was framed as a right rather than a 
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duty, as well as a freedom and an expression of individualism rather than an issue of control and 
conformity (111). Tetsuya Kobayashi elaborates on this as he examines the changing education 
system in Japan, noting that the law followed the general spirit of the Constitution, particularly in 
its emphasis on education as an equal opportunity and freedom (55). He describes that initially, 
the goals surrounding education were nearly universal (58-59). However,  Kobayashi notes a 
shift in goals as he stresses the long-standing power of the Liberal-Democratic Party, whose 
handling of education can be summarized by 1) a regard for “education as a political tool for 
national solidarity and stability” 2) the development of education as a means of economic and 
industrial development and 3) the strengthening leadership of the central government in 
education (68). Ian Gibson follows this shift, paying attention to how the Nakasone Model in the 
eighties stated its goals to be to encourage patriotism and filial piety among students (113). He 
also notes, similar to Kobayashi, an increased focus on bolstering the economy through 
education (113). Most notably however, Gibson demonstrates this change in goals as he 
describes the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito Party’s revision of the Fundamental 
Law of Education in 2006. The revision was the first since its creation and includes that 
“student’s cultivate ‘an attitude that respects tradition and culture and love of the national 
homeland that has fostered them’”(113). Mitsuru Obe reiterates this, noting that “[l]ove for the 
nation and respect for its traditions and culture were established as official goals of the Japanese 
education system”(1),  indicating a clear refocusing of the goals of education to the cultivation of 
the country and national unity rather than solely the individual. Despite this, Kobayashi argues 
that these goals are not shared nation-wide, as many teachers disagree and are unhappy with the 
stated goals (104). In addition, Kobayashi notes a tradition for education to be met with zeal 
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among participants, as its viewed as a method for personal advancement (107). Therefore, there 
exists simultaneous goals of personal cultivation at the local level and development for the nation 
at the government level, the latter being more similar to the pre-war nationalistic goals. 
In regard to national identity, there seems to be more concrete trends of shaping national 
identity than in Germany. For example, Kobayashi notes an early attempt at this in 1966 with the 
issuing by the Central Council for Education of “The Image of the Ideal Japanese”, which listed 
sixteen qualities related to their cultivation of character as an individual, member of the family, 
member of society, and as a national of Japan” (63). Included in the ideals related to being a 
national are a sense of patriotism, a respect for the symbol of the state, and “excellent national 
characteristics” (63); however, other ideals listed throughout the document range from personal 
development, having a strong will, and an emphasis on education at home, to devotion to work 
and social welfare, societal norms, and more (63). This explicit outlining of the ‘ideal Japanese’ 
is a clear attempt at the formation of a national identity, the likes of which could potentially be 
used to describe accepted ‘in’ groups and ‘out’ groups in addition to promoting subordination to 
the collective state. Another example of this is argued by Ian Gibson, as he discusses the 
international education movement under the Nakasone education model in the eighties. He 
explains that although the movement might initially look harmless or progressive, the rhetoric 
surrounding the it “encapsulated the dominant nationalistic view of ​kokusaika​ [international 
studies] as the preservation of Japanese economic power, identity, and national unity” (113). It 
was, he argues, more about defining and protecting cultural barriers rather than transcending 
them (113). Lincicome makes reference to this movement as well in his explanation of the 
pre-war internationalization movement which sought to establish Japan as a dominant power, 
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arguing that the two movements are highly similar in nature (357). Therefore, although not 
specifically about curricula, education is implied to be manipulated once again in order to protect 
a specific identity of the nation. In addition to discussion of the international education 
movement as part of national identity formation in education however, Gibson also discusses the 
introduction of the wartime symbols of ​Kimigayo​ and​ Hinomaru ​(the national anthem and 
standing for the national flag) in schools (114). Ian Buruma discusses this too, drawing parallels 
to the pre-war years (200). Together, both contributors emphasize its controversy as a symbol, 
consistently debated between being either an image of patriotism for Japan or indoctrination 
related to national unity/love for country (Buruma, 200, Gibson, 114).  
Perhaps most central as of late to the debate surrounding national identity formation 
within education is the reinstatement of moral education within Japanese curricula. The Ministry 
of Education outlines Moral Education on their website and states its general purpose: 
“Moral education aims to develop a Japanese citizen who will never lose the 
consistent spirit of respect for his fellow man; who will realize this spirit at home, at 
school and in other actural life situations in the society of which he is a member; who 
strives for the creation of a culture rich in individuality and for the development of a 
democratic nation and society; and who is able to make a voluntary contribution to the 
peaceful international society.” (Ministry of Education, 1).  
The subject of Moral Education has existed for a long time in Japan. Kobayashi describes its 
early post-war development in a wide-variety of subjects as a means to promote a proper 
understanding and affection for Japan and its culture. Kobayashi argues that “These new 
directions in moral education and the teaching of history and geography emphasized national 
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identity and clearly indicated a shift in the aim of national education from universalism to 
particularism or nationalism” (61). Michael Hoffman and Obe Mitsuru discuss its further 
development. Hoffman notes its 2018 transformation from a gradeless topic with informal 
lessons into a nationwide official school subject. He argues that despite its divergence from 
pre-war severity, the idea of a class with grades and curricula is in itself troubling (1). Obe 
discusses this further, noting that as part of this education initiative, new classes will feature 
textbooks which previously did not exist as part of the post-war moral education. The new books 
incorporate the earlier mentioned guidelines for education (1). Due to this development, Obe 
references rising fears, particularly among the more liberal Teachers Union who assert that 
Moral Education forces values on students (1). Despite this, Obe admits that a large portion of 
Japanese support the general idea of ethics education (1). Therefore, although the topic is 
debated, moral education seems to be developing from a simple promotion of cooperative values 
to a more prominent instillation of  ideas about national identity into its students through official 
curricula.  
Finally, both Ian Buruma and Martin Fackler, in their discussions on post-war textbooks, 
note the emphasis on Japan being an anti-war, nation of peace (Buruma 104, Fackler 1). Buruma 
in particular links this to the Peace Education Movement, which he argues, in examining the 
horrors of the past, mines out a message of world peace, with Japan serving as its symbol (104). 
Due to this, both Buruma and Inuzuka postulate that Japan cultivates its identity more around 
that of a victim than an aggressor (Buruma 93-94, 98-99, Inuzuka 143), the likes of which 
although good in nature, could be seen to ignore harder aspects of Japan’s history in order to 
promote a greater affection toward the nation.  
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In general then, there appears to be definite trends toward the promotion of a national 
identity or national unification, as well as a certain level of dedication or love for the country; 
however, protests at the local level may call the success of such goals to question.  
One of the most controversial aspects of Japan’s education system is its handling of 
history. In particular, the subject of textbooks comes up repeatedly in relation to Japan. Jahyun 
Chun describes the history in textbooks most basically, explaining that the empiricist 
historiography was largely retained in Japan, as history is taught with little focus on cause and 
effect (570). Kazuya Fukuoka notes this too in his study on historical memory in Japan. 
Although he ultimately emphasizes the importance of other factors and memory devices besides 
merely textbooks, he describes the history presented in most textbooks, based on his own 
examination and corroborating interviews with students, as shallow, with little emphasis on 
cause/effect (91). As a part of this, he also notes a relatively even distribution between subjects, 
with each subject, no matter the nature, receiving a similar amount of attention in the textbooks 
(91). This trend also extends to controversial subjects. As Jahyun Chun (574-575) and Ako 
Inuzuka (136, 138) argue, when controversial topics such as comfort women are included, the 
topics are covered vaguely. Chun argues that not only is information on the colonized and 
marginalized rarely included (574), but when it is, euphemisms, unclear wording, and other 
attempts to avoid negative descriptions of the events are prevalent (574-575). In his study, he 
explains that this is not just in certain, random textbooks that this occurs, rather he traces these 
patterns in even the three most popular textbooks in Japan at the time (circa 2006) (575). Inuzuka 
confirms this, arguing that even the more critical textbooks are often vague in their descriptions 
(138). Inuzuka also connects this vagueness to the ongoing controversy surrounding Japan’s 
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collective memory during the war, which he claims “shapes and reshapes history as myth” (134). 
As an example of this, Inuzuka examines the infamous Fusosha textbook, which he concludes 
goes so far as to glorify the Japanese military past (143).  Ian Buruma mentions this ongoing 
debate surrounding textbooks as well, explaining the movement as back and forth ‘reforms’ to 
history curricula that come by means of “purging textbooks of all facts that might stand in the 
way of healthy patriotic pride” (xii). In textbooks alone then, there is a clear attempt to 
whitewash Japan’s history, which could be seen to somewhat mythologize Japan’s past in some 
rare cases through glorification of its military, and in more frequent cases, by avoiding its 
wrongdoing.  
In addition to the role of textbooks in history education however, Fukuoka and Gibson 
both comment on the influence of the high intensity exam system in Japan. Both of them argue 
that the focus on test-taking curbs space for critical discussion of historical subjects in classroom, 
which contributes to a shallow discussion and education of critical topics (Fukuoka 91, Gibson 
115). In doing so, schools avoid looking critically at what led to incidents of the past. In addition, 
Fukuoka in his research observes how the examinations shape the curriculum focused on in 
class. He asserts that subjects not stressed in the exams are subsequently not stressed in 
classroom. This becomes particularly significant as exams tend to focus on pre-modern history, 
skipping largely over modern history (91). In turn, even outside of textbooks, the subject of 
Japan’s military history and controversial role in the war tends to be avoided. In addition to this, 
because the emphasis is placed on pre-modern history, the focus of history appears to remain 
largely Japan-centric.  
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However, in discussions related to history education in Japan, the role of teachers is 
essential because as Buruma, Kobayashi, and Gibson note, there is a conflict between the 
conservative Ministry of Education/government and the generally more liberal teachers, in 
particular the Teachers Union (Buruma xii, Gibson 111, Kobayashi 160). For example, the most 
controversial of textbooks, which at times are known to glorify Japan’s military past, are rarely 
adopted by teachers in classrooms (Fukuoka 86, Gibson 115). In addition, Fukuoka emphasizes 
the importance of the views of the teachers themselves, some conservative, but many, liberal and 
more intent on teaching about Japan’s past (94). However, he also notes that due to the 
controversy surrounding said subjects, they have been known to be skipped over or avoided to 
bypass awkwardness (94). Included in this are many teachers who are proponents of Peace 
Education (94), which Buruma cites too as a popular branch of history education (98). However, 
as mentioned earlier, Buruma and Ako Inuzuka both suggest that there is oftentimes a trend, 
even in Peace Education, to view Japan more prominently in the role of victim rather than 
aggressor (Buruma 93-94, 98-99, Inuzuka 143). This could also suggest the preference of one 
history over another, which in turn also downplays or pushes out the darker elements of Japan’s 
past. Through these various elements then, it becomes clear that the history taught in the 
classroom is not bound to what gets included in textbooks, instead, teachers have the power to 
elaborate on the more controversial subjects of Japan’s past and in doing so, have the power to 
counter nationalistic aims that might be otherwise promoted. However, certain trends or policies 
backed by teachers could also serve to further direct emphasis on certain historical narratives 
over others.  
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The subject of control of education is heavily related to history education in Japan. 
During the occupation period, both Gibson and Shibata assert that the precedent for continued 
centralized control of education was set by the Americans, who used the Ministry of Education 
to their advantage in their attempted reforms (Gibson 111, Shibata 84). Kobayashi elaborates on 
this early centralization,  explaining the Ministry’s control as detailed in the 1948 Board of 
Education Law and the 1949 Ministry of Education Establishment Law, which note the 
Ministry’s authority over conducting studies and laying out plans for the promotion of education, 
as well as its ability to set standards in regard to structure, conditions of schooling, and content in 
curriculum (71). Both Kobayashi and Gibson argue however, that the primary seizure of control 
came shortly after the occupation period with the Liberal-Democratic Party's 1958 amendments 
to the Enforcement Regulations for the School Education Act (Gibson 112, Kobayashi 71-72) 
which set that curriculum in public schools must meet the standards of the Ministry (72, 125). 
Gibson relates this to not only to the control over Moral Education (112), but adds that “[b]y 
1961 a system of teacher appraisal had been established along with textbook screening, an 
achievement test to measure children’s progress and the nomination-as opposed to election-of 
administrative staff to local Boards of Education” (112). Buruma cites this also as an example of 
the government seizure of control (192). Throughout this time, as well as nearly consistently into 
present day, these policies have been in the hands of the same Liberal-Democratic Party, who as 
mentioned previously, have been increasingly characterized by their attempts to strengthen the 
government's role in education (Buruma 10, Kobayashi 68). 
Most central to the conversation around government control of education however, is the 
discussion around the censorship of textbooks. Ako Inuzuka discusses the history and 
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development of textbook screenings in Japan with a special focus on the controversial Fusosha 
textbook. He details how prior to release, all textbooks must pass through the Ministry, many 
being sent back with revisions before they can be published (134). He asserts that historically 
textbooks have softened historical events due to the watchful eye of the Ministry, which 
frequently flags books considered a threat to patriotism (135). He notes other often censored 
content such as anti-patriarchal or socialist ideas (135). Ultimately, he argues that “[c]urrent 
textbook screening in Japan does not only present a hurdle for those who demand historic 
‘accuracy’ for their own texts, it also presents a gate for nationalist, revisionist tendencies 
whenever they are in line with the conservative forces that run the country” (145). Chun agrees 
with Gibson in his analysis of textbooks (574, 581). He also details the screening process, and 
states that the final format and content of each book is in the hands of the Ministry of Education 
(574). However, Chun also includes the curriculum guidelines laid out by the Ministry which 
detail “what content is to be placed in each book” (574), which is “made possible through the 
Fundamentals of Education Act” (574). This relates to an earlier description by him of textbooks 
as they relate to collective memory, as officially selected knowledge (571), the knowledge 
placed in the textbooks here being officially​ ​selected by the government, which he specifically 
links this to the strengthening of nationalistic ideology in Japan (574).  
In addition to Inuzuka and Chun, Buruma (192), Gibson (114), and Fukuoka (85) all 
make clear the height of the controversy regarding said policies. However, in addition to control 
of textbooks, Buruma (200) and Gibson (114) note the government's use of authority to reinstate 
the national anthem ​Kimigayo ​and national flag ​Hinomaru​ into schools, along with the 
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subsequent protests against them. Many argue that their reinstatement is too close to pre-war 
nationalism and attempts to foster allegiance to the state (114). 
The reactions against this are reminiscent on some of the other checks to the governments 
centralized control. Buruma for example, notes how in the Fundamental Law of Education, 
textbooks, although screened by the government, are allowed to be selected by the schools 
themselves, not the government (191). Fukuoka references this in his argument against the panic 
toward controversial textbooks, stating that such controversial books are rarely adopted by 
schools (86). This is similar to Kobayashi’s note that private schools have more freedom in their 
curriculum requirements than public schools (125), which denotes an alternative to more heavily 
government controlled education. In addition to also commenting on the adoption of textbooks 
(115), Gibson includes in his report on education reform the transition of training for teachers 
from pre-war, government controlled ‘normal schools’ to independent, liberal arts colleges (111). 
This allows teachers to be trained outside of government influence. In these ways, despite a 
strong bureaucratic system, there is still freedom at the localized levels to divert any nationalist 
trends by the government toward indoctrination.  
However, as noted by Fackler, there was a proposal in 2013 by a government-appointed 
committee to put mayors in charge of local school districts, which is seen as an attempt for more 
political control over education (1). Therefore, it’s clear that the fight between the government 
and local education leaders remains.  
 
Analysis and Discussion
Based on the research, I affirm that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that are 
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taught, history curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to contribute 
to the rise of nationalism within a country, in particular because the majority of research I found 
relating to nationalism and education centered around or included such phenomena. Each of 
these goals can be traced to relate to the definitions of nationalism, such as promotion of the 
nation, love and loyalty to the state and its culture, particularly as a unified group, and the 
subordination or loyalty of the individual to the nation.  
In Germany, during the pre-war this is seen heavily such as in its use of education for 
consolidation of the nation, as well as the definition of a united people, called to sacrifice for the 
greater good of ​their ​nation/state. Mythologized histories and state control played a prominent 
role in this, as did the formation of national identity, such as the consolidation of ​das Volk​. In 
addition, the definition of a united Aryan people allowed for the formation of an in-group to 
accommodate policies directed by the state against the outgroup, chiefly the Jewish people.  
In the post-war however, it appears that Germany has taken strong efforts to diverge from 
their past. The goals for education are aimed more largely at the individual, rather than the state. 
Although there are traces of a national identity formulated around shame for the past, this is not 
directed toward the promotion of the German nation over a particular group or other state. Their 
history, focusing largely and democratically on the darker aspects of their past, as well as on a 
more globalized history, functions in a similar way. The inclusion of heroes of resistance does 
suggest a past slightly formulated for the construction of an identity or path forward, as Chun 
suggests history is able to do. However, being that these heroes of resistance are noted to resist 
against the government/state itself (Buruma 186, 188), it does not seem that this reflects 
nationalist calls for state elevation or promotion. Finally, the decentralized formation of 
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education, which perpetuates democratic policy, suggests the maintenance of curricula outside of 
political influence, which prevents ideological indoctrination or state bias.  
During the pre-war era in Japan, the primary themes related to nationalism can be seen 
similarly to Germany, in the unification of national identity and people in order to strengthen the 
state. Despite the existence of slightly alternate views, due to a general consensus of national 
superiority, this form of nationalism prevailed as the central goal of Japan’s education. National 
identity, as mentioned, consisted most significantly on a unified set of values which promoted 
subordination of individual to the collective, most notably, the emperor as the supreme symbol of 
the state. History was mythologized in order to promote a divine legacy which ought to be 
preserved and could be used to assert superiority. Finally, centralized control allowed for 
indoctrination of students with these ethics and goals of the state, with increased emphasis on 
militarization over time. 
In current society, the government goals have been reworded, but there is a continued 
desire among government and Ministry officials for education to foster proper respect and 
patriotism in regard to the country. The reinstatement of Moral Education as an official school 
subject seems to be in line with this goal, as it is obviously and increasingly reminiscent of the 
earlier prescribed national ethics, although not in any way to the level of post-1932 
ultra-nationalism. The officially curated history as outlined in textbooks promotes this as well, as 
does the centralized control of education which controls policy, curricula, and textbook 
screenings. Heavily censored textbooks, as well as other elements such as exams and controversy 
surrounding certain subjects, contribute to the lack of discussion about darker elements of 
Japan’s past and construct a sensitized view of Japan’s legacy, which could be seen as an attempt 
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to cultivate national pride and loyalty. This focus could also be considered to inhibit an increased 
understanding of Japan’s place within the global community. However, the centralized control of 
matters of curricula is checked by local efforts, largely the Teachers Union and other educators, 
as many outside the government view the goals of education differently, and wish to promote the 
cultivation of the individual, not the state. Many also desire to work toward the promotion of 
peace, which although often more critical in its approach to history and more globalized in its 
nature, could be seen as an attempt to form a national identity that puts Japan’s role as a victim 
over it’s simultaneous role as an aggressor. In addition, private institutions are said to be exempt 
from the heavy control of the Ministry. Therefore, nationalist policies are continuously countered 
by efforts to circumvent them as actors in Japan play tug-of-war between those seeking first and 
foremost promotion of the country and those fearful for a return to Japan’s nationalist, 
militaristic past.  
 
Suggestions for further research
In conducting this research, there were several questions I came across that could be looked into. 
In his paper, Fukuoka notes a wide variety of sources that contribute to the formation of 
collective memory, how people remember their nations history. Although many people assert 
textbooks to be the primary mark of a nation’s understanding of history, this is not so. In my 
research I focused primarily on matters related to formation education, and as such, was only 
able to examine this influence on memory. As such, research that steers more in the direction of 
history could examine these various memory devices such as television, music, news sources, 
and more, particularly in Japan, where I found many tendencies to overemphasize the danger of 
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a single, not widely adopted textbook to the collective, national memory. In addition, my 
research concentrated only on undergraduate levels of education for simplicity, so examinations 
into upper levels of schooling would be helpful.  
In relation to questions of identity, research based on the conference surrounding 
globalized history could be done to trace the extent to which German history is based around 
forming a unified European identity, particularly in relation to the European Union, rather than a 
national or global identity. Finally, citizenship education for refugees could be studied to see to 
what extent similar ideas of European identity, or even the earlier mentioned “consciousness” of 
being a German are taught (Shibata 122).  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in my research I posed the question: How has education contributed to the 
formation or prevention of nationalism in Germany and Japan? In examining this, after defining 
the standard ideas of nationalism, I applied these definitions to pre-war and post-war Germany 
and Japan. Ultimately, I concluded that the goals of education, concepts of national identity that 
are taught, history curricula, and control of education all historically have the potential to 
contribute to the rise of nationalism within a country. Based on this, I postulate that while 
Germany has made definite strides to steer away from nationalism in its response to these areas, 
Japan has at the government level, struggled to move from pre-war trends, despite meeting some 
success at the local level. In coming to understand this, we can not only thoughtfully support 
efforts to diverge from nationalism at the international level, but hopefully we can as individuals, 
engage with the structures local to us in order to do the same.  
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